I.
To accommodate the staggering increase in federal litigation that has occurred in recent years, the federal judicial process has been gradually, but significantly, transformed. The number of federal judges has dramatically increased at both the trial and appellate levels.' The number of law clerks and "staff attorneys" employed in the courts of appeals also has grown dramatically. 2 Moreover, an increasing number of cases that are deemed lacking in merit for one reason or another are now decided without oral argument, 3 formal opinion, or even a terse statement of reasons. 4 These changes, which have been made in the hope of increasing judicial productivity, 5 have not been made without significant costs to the quality of justice. 6 My concern is that these costs have been too high. In the language of the economists, the time has come to carefully assess whether the marginal cost of generating one more decision in a given period of time does not exceed the value of that decision, both to society and to the parties immediately involved in a dispute that requires reasoned resolution.
Much has been written about the elusive subjects of judging 7 and judicial administration. 8 A substantial part of the entire production is aptly summarized in two observations. The first comes not from a lawyer, law professor or judge, but from H. L. Mencken, a man not known for deference to received wisdom in the legal profession or elsewhere. Mencken, it is said, once sent a letter of congratulations to a friend who had recently become a judge. Lest his friend be misled by his new-found stature in the world of lawyers, Mencken tempered his congratulations with the warning that his friend should remember that a judge is nothing but a law student who grades his own papers. My second observation comes from a more orthodox source-Justice Brandeis-who observed that judges are respected "because we do our own work." 9 These two observations sum up what I take to be the traditional understanding of the judicial office: an office whose duties are defined in terms of the actions, judgment and explanations not of a committee, but of an individual. That the Founders of our Republic recognized this fact is evidenced by their efforts to guarantee 5 A substantial volume of literature has developed dealing with problems of judicial efficiency and productivity. E.g., RI The judge is also unique among public officials because he has no authority to set his own agenda. A judge must hear whatever case is brought before him.' s We expect the judge, regardless of how inconsequential a case might seem to be, to bring all his intellectual power and judgment to bear on the issues before him, with the expectation that he will reach the correct result for the right reasons. 19 The judge's profession is one, as Judge Friendly has aptly remarked, whose "favorite word is 'why.' "20 The "bottom line" is not unimportant, but it is not in itself the measure of judicial performance. When we read a judicial opinion, we may be swayed in some small measure by whether the writer shares our views or prejudices and concludes with the words "AFFIRMED" as we ourselves would. 21 But it is what comes before-how the issues are stated and how they are resolved-that leads us to conclude whether this is a judge we are glad to have. Thus, we expect the judge, like no other public official, to justify his decisions with reason. Several commentators recently have described this aspect of the judicial process as a "dialogue." 22 This characterization well captures the personal tone of the business of judging. The notion of dialogue-attentive listening, comprehension, and reasoned response -embodies the standard we have set for judges.
It is because the quality of the judicial process necessarily depends upon these qualities of the individual that we require federal judges to be men and women in whom the appointing authority reposes "special trust and confidence," as the Federal Commission recites, because of their "wisdom, uprightness and learning. 21 Some might question whether reasoned analysis is as important for the litigants as it is for the victor, but try explaining to a client why the court ruled against him when the only judgment you have says nothing more than "affirned." K. LLEwELLEN, supra note 7, at 26 (" [The] opinion is addressed also to the losing party and counsel in an effort to make them feel at least that they have had a fair break .. "). We should not, therefore, lightly disregard trends tending to "depersonalize" the judicial function. Against this background, I would like to examine briefly the changes that have recently been made in the judicial process to accommodate the increase in the federal caseload.
II.
Few would dispute that the caseload in the federal courts has reached crisis proportions. 2 4 A few statistics make the point clearly.
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1940, there were fifty-seven circuit judges and 3,446 appeals were filed.
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1980, 4,225 appeals were filed in the Fifth Circuit alone. 26 The number of judges in the Fifth Circuit is somewhat less than half the total number of circuit judges in 1940.27 The Sixth Circuit, the court on which I sat, provides even more startling evidence: forty-one percent of all the appeals that the Sixth Circuit has heard since 1891 have been filed within the past decade. 28 siders not only the increased volume of litigation, but also the increased complexity of individual cases, 32 there can be no doubt that the federal judicial system has been pushed almost to the point of collapse. 33 III.
Attempts to deal with the vastly increased volume of litigation have focused on treating symptoms rather than causes. Efforts have centered upon speeding up the judicial process, so the increased caseload can be processed more quickly. Thus, a number of recent developments in judicial administration have muted the traditionally personal character of the judicial process.
These developments have occurred in a number of related areas: the number of judges has been increased, policies concerning the publication and content of judicial opinions have been altered, significant parts of the process of judicial decisionmaking have been delegated to staff attorneys and law clerks, and oral arguments have been reduced in number, length and importance. All of these changes may have significant effects upon the traditional structure of the judicial office. Consequently, they merit a closer examination, with particular attention to their impact upon the judicial process as it has evolved.
A common response to the litigation explosion has been to increase the number of active judges. 34 We cannot continue forever to simply add more judges, however, if we intend to maintain a system of adjudication in which judicial decisions are made by the individuals who have been chosen to judge. There have been, however, indications in recent years that the position of a federal judge may no longer be perceived as being as attractive as it once was. 8 Many of the most capable lawyers, some of whom might even meet Judge Pound's description of the ideal, decline to be considered, while others serve only for a short time before returning to the bar. Surely, the causes of this phenomenon are numerous and complex.
In particular, the work is hard and the pay is not high. 39 I would suggest, also, that the proliferation of federal judgeships has itself added to the problem by lowering the status of the position. 40 The problems inherent in unlimited judicial expansion are more serious, however, than perceptions of prestige. ScmnDHAusER, supra note 37.
The issue of judicial salaries has come to the attention of both the courts and the public. In 1976, a number of federal judges brought suit in the U.S. Court of Claims seeking an increase in judicial salaries, on the theory that the effects of problems are created for the administration of justice, as recently occurred in the Fifth Circuit. After years of steady growth both in caseload and in the number of authorized judgeships, that court now has twenty-five active judges, fifteen of whom have been appointed since October 1977. 41 The judges of the Fifth Circuit sat en banc in January 1980. After that experience, they voted unanimously to support legislation splitting the circuit. 42 As the Fifth Circuit judges themselves recognized, the expansion of a court can create intrinsic difficulties that are among the most serious of those generated by the increased caseload that originally created the need for additional judges. There is a loss of collegiality, a greater likelihood of intra-circuit conflicts, and an almost self-defeating cumbersomeness in the en banc hearings that are intended to permit resolution of those conflicts.
The Fifth Circuit was recently split. The Ninth Circuit should probably be split as well. 43 But that course is not one that 41631 F.2d XIII-XIV (1981) ( circuits by a wide margin in terms of the numbers of appeals commenced, cases terminated, and cases pending. The Fifth Circuit had 4,225 cases commenced, 3,810 cases terminated, and 4,273 cases pending. The Ninth Circuit had, respectively, 3,738, 3,177, and 4,618 cases in these categories. The nearest circuit to these two in numbers of appeals commenced was the Second with 2,171. In numbers of dispositions, the nearest was the Fourth, with 2,242. Finally, the closest on the basis of cases pending was the Sixth, with 2,366. REPoRT OF THE DmEcToa, supra note 1, can be pursued for long as a general solution to the problems that face our courts. There is a limit to the number of circuits that we can have without diminishing the desirable multi-state character of the courts of appeals. 44 The character of the circuit courts would surely change if every populous or litigious state were to become a single circuit. Moreover, there is a limit to the number of circuits that can exist if the essential uniformity of federal law is to be preserved. 45 It is not unusual for years to elapse before the Supreme Court resolves conflicts among the existing eleven circuits.
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The Court could not hope to resolve all important circuit conflicts if the number of circuits were significantly increased. Accordingly, as circuits would become more localized and parochial, they also would become more certainly courts of last resort.
47
A second response to heavier caseloads has been to provide judges with more law clerks 48 or to delegate judicial responsibility to staff attorneys. 40 Law clerks have been a part of the American judicial process for nearly a century. 50 Originally intended as cleri- 44 Professor Wright has stated that:
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the regional character of the courts of appeals . . . [State courts] are state-oriented not nationallyoriented. This is precisely the quality which the federal courts of appeals must avoid. They must apply a national system of law in such fashion as will best serve the national interest. Kurland's description of his clerkship conveys the sense of an atmosphere charged with intellectual energy. Although experiences no doubt varied from judge to judge, 56 the clerk's principal non-clerical task had become the critiquing of judicial opinions and arguments. 5 7 For the clerk, it was a unique educational experience. r8 For the law, it was a process in which reasons and results were thoroughly challenged. Importantly, however, the arrange- 
L. REv. 390 (1971).
55 Kurland, supra note 54, at 663. 5 6 Newland, supra note 50, at 311 ("their duties have been determined entirely by their individual justices"). 57 K. LLEwELLYN, supra note 7, at 322; Baler, supra note 50, at 296 ("a valuable sounding board"); Kurland, supra note 54, at 663; Newland, supra note 50, at 314; Meador, supra note 54, at 59-60. ment focused on testing the judge's work, and not on substituting the clerk's efforts for it.
When I first became a judge, we were still operating with one clerk. Later, we had two. While I never served under the present system of three clerks, 59 I am not sure that I could really use three clerks and still believe that I was the one, as Professor Kurland puts it, "who had the last word." In any event, it seems to me undesirable that we move beyond three clerks. There are inherent limits to the amount and types of work that can safely be delegated to clerks. 60 Perhaps of greater importance, there are limits to the amount of time and energy that any one person can be expected to devote to the supervision of even the brightest of law clerks. It is not enough that the judge be sufficiently satisfied with the clerk's work that he is willing to sign it. The judge must make the critical decisions in the analysis and the execution of the work. Clerks are certainly helpful in relieving judges of some of the burden, but it is the judge who was appointed to weigh the issues in every case, and there are limits to the number of cases he can personally judge. Finally, the increase in the number of clerks may significantly alter the role of the clerk. Rather than critiquing and testing judicial work, clerks may come to perform this work themselves. All of these considerations raise doubts in my mind as to the wisdom of further increasing the role of law clerks in the judicial process.
A development that I regard with even greater concern, however, is the growth-I might say cancerous growth-of central staff attorneys' offices. 61 As of a year ago, there were 136 persons employed as staff attorneys in the federal courts. 62 Central staff attorneys perform a variety of functions, including several that are grounds for some concern. 6 3 They make initial recommendations 63 The central staff attorneys have been given responsibility over many tasks that were originally the province of the judges assigned to the case. First, the whether cases warrant oral argument and how they should be decided. 64 In some cases for which they deem oral argument unnecessary, they prepare draft opinions for consideration by a panel of judges. 65 These arrangements, while contributing generally to the development of a more bureaucratic judicial process, 66 are at odds in several specific respects with traditional notions of the judicial office. As pointed out earlier, we have long expected that the judge "will do his own work," and that he will be directly involved in the decisionmaking process. Similarly, we have expected that judges hear whatever claims are brought before them. The widespread use of staff attorneys creates the possibility that these expectations will not be realized.
While I have no statistics to support my conjecture, I would not be surprised if the press of business might tempt some judges to give the briefs in cases deemed unworthy of judicial attention a cursory look at best. Indeed, I have seen many opinions in the last few years that contain substantial internal evidence of cursory central staff has the job of "screening" cases when they are initially filed with the appellate court. The screening staff, according to Judge Hufstedler, acquires a case at the moment the notice of appeal is filed, shepherds it through each procedural step until the closing brief is in, prepares legal memoranda, drafts a proposed opinion or other disposition, recommends grant or denial of oral argument, and presents the complete package to the judges to be graded pass/fail. Hellman refers to a process within Hufstedler's screening phase that he terms "inventory." Hellman, supra note 43, at 944. This process requires the staff attorneys and law clerks to read the case's records and briefs, and to prepare "inventory cards" that contain information that assists the court in preparing its arguments calendar. Id. Most importantly, the attorneys will assign a given case a particular "weight," or "a numerical estimate of the relative difficulty of the case from the judges' standpoint. The weights are used to equalize the workloads assigned to the various panels sitting in any given month." Id.
Once a case has been placed on the court's calendar, it will be assigned to a three-judge panel. The court's staff law clerks will be responsible for preparing bench memoranda on the cases scheduled for argument, and the judge assigned to write the opinion of the court may request staff attorney assistance in the drafting of opinions in cases that the law clerks have not previously handled. Id. 945. A detailed description of staff attorney functions can be found in D. MEADOR 67 It is not at all rare to see unpublished, per curiam opinions containing obvious logical-and even grammatical-flaws, 8 all carried beneath the names of three judges whose published opinions generally demonstrate clear thinking and precise writing. One explanation of this phenomenon is that such opinions are not authored in chambers and receive only the most fleeting consideration when they reach the judge's desk. This phenomenon gives substance to fears that the use of staff attorneys will alter our traditional expectation that judges hear whoever comes before their court. 0 9 More obvious, perhaps, is the stark contrast between poorly reasoned and written opinions and our fundamental expectation that judicial decisions will be accompanied by reasoned justifications. 70 Delegation of some aspects of the judge's work is essential, as is no doubt true of much of the work of many other public officials. Such delegation appears particularly desirable against the background of overloaded dockets. 7 1 But we must not lose sight of the fundamental changes in the nature of the judicial enterprise that may accompany delegation of too many or too critical aspects of the judge's work.
On one level, excessive delegation results in a product shaped by people other than the men and women chosen because of their "wisdom, uprightness, and learning." We might well repose considerably less "trust and confidence" in a group of faceless assistants than we do in the appointed judge. On another level, excessive delegation poses a threat to the traditional institutional structure of the judicial office. We can no longer count on receiving the personal attention of a judge who is insulated by layers of staff. Elimination of time-consuming oral argument and considered opinions in cases deemed meritless is another of the palliatives increasingly used to reduce the burden of the caseload. 7 2 For example, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1980, the Fifth Circuit disposed of 1,078 cases without oral argument. 73 About onethird of those cases were disposed of in "opinions" that said simply:
See Local Rule 21," or "ENFORCED. See Local Rule 21." 74 Such summary justice may be necessary in our society today. But in my judgment it is efficiency achieved at too great a cost. My experience as a judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals leads me to believe that oral argument, although sometimes fruitless, is often useful for both the bench and bar. 75 Points not clearly made in briefs can often be forcefully made in oral argument, or at least adequately explained as a result of persistent questioning. Cases that clearly seem to be "predestined . . . to affirmance without opinion," to use Cardozo's phrase, 76 sometimes seem less predestined after oral argument. Oral argument is the most visible, and often the most effective, form of "dialogue" between judge and litigant. Curtailment of this type of exchange further alters our perception of the judicial office as a personal one.
Little need be said about the desirability of opinions. All of us have had seemingly brilliant ideas that turned out to be much less so when we attempted to put them to paper. 77 [Vol. 129:777-tious judge has struggled, and finally changed his mind, when confronted with the "opinion that won't write." 7s We can only guess .at the number of decisions "affirmed without opinion" that might have been reversed had a judge attempted to write an opinion explaining the announced result. Moreover, a five-or ten-word opinion provides neither the litigants nor the rest of us with the reasoned analysis central to the judge's enterprise. 79 This development, together with the use of staff attorneys to screen cases, the reductions in oral arguments, and the increasing delegation of responsibilities to law clerks, seems to strike close to the heart of traditional notions of the judicial process. These changes subtly alter what I have termed the "personal" character of the judicial office. 8 0 Judges may no longer hear every case, but only the important ones. They may no longer engage in genuine dialogue with litigants nor be expected to give reasons for the decisions they announce. These ,changes ultimately may prove unimportant. In light of the traditional importance of the personal character of the judicial office, however, a miscalculation might prove costly. I recognize that there is room for considerable difference of opinion on this issue. My point is simply that these are costs that must be weighed against the benefits of the changes in the federal courts system.
IV.
Lest my uneasiness be thought the mere speculations of a curmudgeon, a judge turned lawyer, let me briefly describe the experience of one state appellate court, which may serve, if not to reveal the difficulties that are present in the federal courts today, at least to highlight the difficulties that await the federal court system. In a recent article, political scientist John Wold reported on his study of the California Court of Appeal. 81 Professor Wold and a colleague interviewed forty-one of the fifty-six judges of the California Court of Appeal, the state's intermediate court, which sits in thirteen divisions in five districts.8 2 The court, like many others, has 78 See Helman, supra note 43, at 939. Compare K. LLwErLLrx, supra note 7,
.at 101-06; J. Fumu, supra note 7, at 100 ("Judging begins rather the other way around-with a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily starts with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find premises which will substantiate it. If he cannot, to his satisfaction, find proper arguments to link up his conelusion with premises which he finds acceptable, he will, unless he is arbitrary or mad, reject the conclusion and seek another."). 
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experienced an explosive increase in litigation. In fiscal year 1976, 10,797 cases were filed-approximately 570 cases per panel. 8 3 The candor with which the judges discussed their work is commendable; what they had to say is frightening. For instance, one judge remarked, "We have chances for creativity a couple of times a year, maybe. But we're too busy to think that much. We give each case full consideration, but this is essentially an assembly line." 8 Apparently, the only way that the system works at all is through a procedure whereby incoming cases are screened by permanent central staff attorneys who weed out appeals that they consider nonmeritorious 8 5 The staff then prepares memorandum opinions in those cases. As Professor Wold said in his article: "The staff product does not become the decision of the court until the judges themselves adopt it. But judicial adoption, perhaps with minor modifications, is typically perfunctory, and the memoranda are eventually handed down as 'By-the-Court' opinions." 86 Significantly, some judges complained that not enough cases were delegated to the staff. With respect to the opinions that they wrote, the judges noted that they did not receive credit under the court's "unofficial quota system" for writing separate concurrences or dissents, thereby creating an institutional bias in favor of unanimous decisions even in concededly difficult cases. 8 With disarming candor, one judge said, "I hate to say this, but just the workload alone may encourage one judge to agree with the others, because otherwise he or she would have to write a dissenting opinion." 89 The judges also noted that a callousness had developed out of boredom, 90 and that "they constantly had to remind themselves that all cases deserved their close scrutiny, since appeals sometimes proved to be much more deserving of attention than they appeared at first glance." o- I would venture to guess that the situation that is developing in the federal courts of appeals is not different in kind from that which is portrayed in Professor Wold's study. The remedies with which we are experimenting in the federal courts have been tested in California, and they have clearly failed to solve the problem. The system of churning out staff-generated per curiam opinions in the intermediate appellate court was recently described by Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court as "turning our appellate justices into administrators processing paper in a large bureaucracy, rather than judges writing opinions." 92
In the eyes of a number of observers, the changes in judicial administration adopted in California have altered the character of the judicial office. It is difficult, if not impossible, to square the image of "administrators processing paper in a large bureaucracy" with the traditional view of judging as a "personal" business centering on dialogue and reasoned analysis. To return to Justice Brandeis for a moment, can the judges who hand down these per curiam opinions say that they "do their own work"? And if they cannot, will they continue to command our respect?
V.
In the federal system, however, we have the basis for a solution -at least a partial solution-that is not available to the states. Quite simply, the federal courts are-and ought to be-courts of limited jurisdiction. 93 For the most part, the scope of that jurisdiction is determined by Congress, which need not, of course, assign all the problems of our society for solution to the federal courts.94 Congress might take a hard look at where the bulk of the federal caseload comes from and determine where, given limitations of judicial time, the jurisdiction of the federal courts can best be cut back. The protracted and continuing debate over diversity jurisdiction, however, does not suggest that this solution will be speedily or easily implemented. 95 In any event, such suggestions simply shift the burden to the state judicial systems, which if California is representative, are also staggering under the weight of their caseloads. 96 The plight of the federal courts has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the legislative branch in recent years. 97 Congress has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to the situation of the judiciary, and several reform efforts have been undertaken. 9 " As I have suggested, however, many of these reforms are directed at the symptoms and not the causes of the crisis. 99 Moreover, some of these developments run directly counter to traditional notions of the judicial office. 10 0 I suggest that consideration be given to addressing the dilemma of the federal courts on a more fundamental level. Congress, in recent years, has legislated in more and more areas that once were considered the province of the states. :0 In addition, legislation has been drafted in increasingly general terms. 02 Such generality, of course, creates numerous appeals on issues of legislative intent, -complex appeals in which there are no easy answers. Similarly, courts now frequently are called upon to make quasi-legislative decisions, filling in ever-increasing gaps in statutory law. These decisions, requiring consideration of a wide variety of facts and policy, 03 are equally difficult for courts to resolve. 1°0 4 Such cases, of course, take time, an undeniably scarce resource in our courts.
Congress, of course, could not legislate so as to avoid the necessity for statutory construction. 05 It could, however, do a better job than it does. One need only call to mind the amount of ink and the amount of judicial time that has been spent in recent years .on the question whether Congress has created, sub silentio, a private cause of action under various federal statutes. 06 Congress .assuredly cannot eliminate all questions that will arise under the statutes that it enacts, even with respect to remedial provisions, -but fundamental questions, such as whether private parties have the right to bring suit under a statute, are certainly ones that Congress can be expected to answer.
Although legislative actions clearly contributed to the litigation explosion, the federal courts also have had a hand in the development of the crisis. The willingness of the federal courts to assume increased "legislative" responsibilities has no doubt contributed to the current caseload crisis. Many, perhaps all, of the judiciary's activities in this area are important and probably desirable. Yet they have been accompanied by significant costs: attempts to cope with increased responsibilities have resulted in our courts becoming increasingly bureaucratic. So drastic an alteration in the judicial office as traditionally conceived ought to be undertaken only after careful conl Id. 730-31.
"I'The classic view was that the judge legislates interstitially, filling in gaps left in statutory schemes. Justice Holmes wrote, "judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) . See B. CARDozo, supra note 7, at 68-70, 113-14 ("He legislates only between gaps."). The recent trend has been to recognize a more expansive judicial lawmaking role. E.g., Fiss, supra note 14, passim.
112 Professor Fuller, exploring the limits of the adjudicatory process, has pointed out the difficulties that are encountered when "polycentrie" problems are dealt with through the judicial process. Fuller, supra note 16, at 394-405. Fuller, recognizing that " [t] here are polycentric elements in almost all problems submitted to adjudication," argued that certain problems involve so many interrelated tensions that they are "beyond the proper limits of adjudication." Id. 395, 397. Fullers reasoning supports justice Powell's conclusion that the courts have involved themselves too deeply in nonadjudicative activities. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31. See also Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 431-32 ("A proper appreciation of the forms and limits of adjudication turns in large part on determining the point at which... the process becomes unequal to the task because the nature of the problem demands more diffuse forms of responsiveness and participation than adjudication can legitimately provide.").
For a broader view of the capabilities of the judicial process, which also recognizes the limits of the adjudicatory process, see Fiss, supra note 14.
11a Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731.
114
Id. 115 Authorities cited supra note 112. But see 2 K. DAVIs, supra note 103, at § 10.3, at 316 (recognizing that Fullers theories are valid, but arguing that they are appropriate only with respect to trials).
sideration.' n8 In responding to the litigation explosion, attention should be given to the causes of the crisis. A more serious evaluation of what proposed legislation will require of the courts might well ease existing caseloads. Similarly, the judiciary itself might consider more closely what its decisions will require of future judges. Although these suggestions are quite broad, I hope that they represent a first step towards coping with the litigation explosion without fundamentally altering the judicial process. It is clear that if the federal judicial system is to work in a way that is faithful to the ends for which it exists, something must be done. Only thus can we assure that the federal courts will remain effectively available to vindicate constitutional and important federal statutory rights.
A great judge of the Second Circuit, Charles M. Hough, once wrote that "the legal mind must assign some reason in order to decide anything with spiritual quiet." 117 It is incumbent upon all of us to do our utmost to restore the conditions necessary for our appellate courts to dispatch their constitutional obligations with "spiritual quiet," as well as with efficiency.
I am an alumnus of a state court system and of the federal courts, and because I have great respect for our judicial institutions, I hope that I have not sounded a discordant note. The Scriptures ask, "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?" 118 1 trust that I have sounded an appropriate alarm and that those of us who would preserve our precious and imperilled courts as effective institutions will give heed and respond.
116 Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 430 ("adjudication has a moral force and this force is in major part a function of those elements that distinguish adjudication from all other forms of ordering. In the long run, the cost of departing from these elements may be a forfeiture of the moral force of the judicial role. 
